



The principal focus of this Comment is the use of privileges to protect
information from discovery in the course of a lawsuit. The protection
afforded by the first amendment to organizations and members of
organizations appeared with clarity in the 1958 United States Supreme
Court decision of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.' Whenever
freedom of association is at issue this case as well as its progeny must be
considered. Thus, this Comment first sets out a brief background of the
theory of privilege, examines NAACP and its two major holdings, and
then attempts to come to terms with the meaning of NAA CPto the Court.
1. PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL
Professor Wigmore's discussion of the duty to testify is a good
backdrop to an understanding of privilege. According to Wigmore "there
is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving
and ...any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional,
being so many derogations from a positive general rule."2 By virtue of
being a member of society one has a duty to give testimony in any causes of
action of which one may have knowledge. Our duty to assist others in the
maintenance of their rights "necessarily flows from the relations we bear
each other as members of the same community, we being mutually
dependent upon each other for security and protection."3 Just as our duty
to testify is founded on our relation with the community as a whole, the
community as a whole also has a right to the testimony. The demand for
our testimony comes from the "community as a whole-from justice as an
institution and from law and order as indispensable elements of civilized
life."' 4 Wigmore finds the rationale for the duty to testify in the very fabric
of a civilized society; justice suffers neglect in every refusal to recognize the
1. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
2. 8 J. WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. Wigmore quotes Jeremy Bentham on the extent of the general right
that one member of the public has to the testimony of another:
Are men of the first rank and consideration, are men high in office, men whose time is not less
valuable to the public than to themselves,-are such men to be forced to quit their business,
their functions, and what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious
adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary,-they
and everybody! What if, instead of parties, they were witnesses? Upon business of other
people's everybody is obliged to attend, and nobody complains of it. Were the Prince of
Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the
same coach while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a
halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think
proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.
Bentham, Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 320 (Bowring ed. 1843), quoted in 8 WIGMORE, supra, § 2192 at 71.
3. Bennett v. Waller, 23 Ill. 97, 179 (1859), quoted in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192 at 72.
4. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192 at 73.
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duty. Hence, every privilege exercised in avoidance of the duty to testify is
exceptional; it is of a profoundly unusual nature.5 The strength of
Wigmore's sentiment on this basic premise of civilized society is expressed
as follows:
[All privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional and therefore to
be discountenanced. There must be good reason, plainly shown, for their ex-
istence. In the interest of developing scientifically the details of the various
recognized privileges, judges and lawyers are apt to forget this exceptional na-
ture. The presumption against their extension is not observed in spirit. The
trend of the day is to expand them as if they were large and fundamental prin-
ciples, worthy of pursuit into the remotest analogies. This attitude is an un-
wholesome one. The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimon-
ial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. They
should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by principle.
Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an
obstacle to the administration ofjustice.
The corollary of the individual's duty to society is the society's
obligation to "make the duty as little onerous as possible"7 to minimize the
burdens placed on those who fulfill their duties to testify. This expectation
that society not unnecessarily burden one who performs his duty is not
only satisfying to our basic sense of fairness but is also coherent from the
point of view of rewards and reinforcers for behavior. A general
unwillingness to assist the system of justice can be anticipated when those
who do fulfill their duty are noticeably burdened by the performance of
their duty.
Wigmore finds no difference in principle between the duty to testify
and the duty to produce documents, since "to give up facts possessed by
physical control is no different from the giving up of data possessed as
mental impressions.' 8 Recognized privileges relating to documents include
title deeds and securities under a lien, trade secrets, a civil party's
documents, official documents, self-incriminating documents and various
confidential communications. 9
Because the individual has a duty to testify or produce documents as
part of his overall obligation to assist in the maintenance of the rights of
others, and thus the orderly continuation of a civilized society as a whole,
the privileges are personal to their holder. Exceptions to the general duty
are "in no sense provided for the benefit of the litigant party whose
opponent is deprived by them of the evidence which he desires."' Claims
of privilege must always be seen as obstacles to "the ascertainment of the
5. Id.
6. Id. Accord, Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); In re Story, 159 Ohio St.
144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953).
7. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192 at 73.
8. Id. § 2193 at 74-75.
9. Id. at 75.
10. Id. § 2196 at 111.
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truth, and these are suffered only because the several extrinsic policies are
deemed to be in these respects paramount to the purpose of ascertaining
the facts in issue."1" The basic question that always must be asked
regarding a claim of privilege is whether the policy considerations
protecting a witness in silence outweigh the purpose of judicial inquiry in
the discovery of truth.
When a privilege is said to be personal, it means that only the
individual who holds the privilege may claim it. Consequently, error in
dishonoring the privilege can be objected to only by the individual holding
the privilege. Since privilege operates against full disclosure of the truth, a
party cannot be heard to complain of the improper denial of a privilege.
12
If, however, the court improperly honors a claim to privilege, then the
party who attempted to obtain the testimony can complain, for his
interests and the interest of the discovery of truth are abused by such an
erroneous decision.13
In understanding privileges in general it is important to distinguish
them from rules of exclusion, another means by which full disclosure of
"evidence" is denied. Professor McCormick distinguished the two by
identifying rules of exclusion as having the "common purpose to facilitate
the ascertainment of the facts by guarding against evidence which is
unreliable or is calculated to prejudice or mislead."'14 In high contrast are
privileges that
do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather ...shut out
the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships
which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to
justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the
administration of justice.'5
Privileges are embodied in common law and statutes. Among the
policy considerations in the development of a privilege are protected
constitutional rights. A great body of law has grown up around the most
clearly acknowledged privilege not to testify-that of the fifth amendment
right not to incriminate oneself. That body of law attempts to construe the
language of the constitutional conferment of the right. The law also
specifies those who may be holders of the testimonial privilege based on
this constitutional right and the circumstances under which the privilege
can be successfully asserted. In other words, even though the policy
favoring the avoidance of testimony is in part a constitutional right, the
privilege will not be automatically honored. The United States Supreme
II. Id.
12. Id. at 112. Some courts do not hold to such a strict interpretation of holder of privilege and
permit appeal to be based on an improper denial of privilege to a non-party. Cases are cited and
discussed in C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 73 at 153 (Cleary ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
13. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2196 at 113.
14. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 72 at 152.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
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Court has acknowledged the importance of this privilege in forbidding
comment upon the silence of one exercising the privilege 6 and by holding
that one who remains in privileged silence shall "suffer no penalty" for his
silence.' 7 Wigmore contends that there is no agreement on the policy of the
privilege against self-incrimination because there is no single privilege."
Rather, there are diverse circumstances and diverse potential holders of
the privilege and diverse proceedings in which the privilege may be
asserted.' 9 Thus, even concerning the most broadly recognized privilege
and one that is based unmistakably on constitutional protection, courts
have faced and will continue to face the weighing of the policies in favor of
the privilege against the desire for truth.
The focus of this Comment is on the rationale and extent of the
privilege not to testify or produce documents with respect to one's
associations. Peculiar to this privilege is the interplay between the first
amendment rights and the alleged necessity of anonymity with respect to
the exercise of those rights. In this regard, the rationale of the associational
privilege appears most clearly in the context of Wigmore's four conditions
for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of com-
munications. Those four conditions are:
(I) The communication must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the cor-
rect disposal of litigation.20
While Wigmore employs this set of conditions to examine privileges such
as attorney-client, husband-wife, and priest-penitent, it seems that these
conditions can do much to bring out the structure of recognition of an
associational right.
Finally, before turning to the associational right and its related
privilege, it is important to observe two trends in the law of privileges, one
of which operates in favor of and the other against a narrow construction
or privileges. It has already been noted that the general principle is that
one has a duty to testify and that exemptions from the duty are in discord
with the purpose of a system of justice to find the truth. As McCormick has
put a similar point, "the development of judge-made privileges virtually
halted a century ago."'2 He further stated that "in more recent times the
16. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
17. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2251 at 295-318.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2285 at 527 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
21. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 77 at 156.
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attitude of commentators, whether from the bench, the bar, or the schools,
has tended to view privileges from the standpoint of the hindrance to
litigation resulting from their recognition [that the] granting of a claim of
privilege can serve only to 'shut out the light' . . . .,22
A trend also is developing which recognizes that there is an ever-
diminishing privacy.2 3 That trend was acknowledged by McCormick in the
following terms:
The privileges have survived largely unaffected by . . . winnowings of
the law by eminent scholars and jurists who saw them as suppressing the
truth, for it is evident that for many people, judges, lawyers and laymen, the
protection of confidential communications from enforced disclosure has
been thought to represent rights of privacy and security too important to
relinquish to the convenience of litigants. Growing concern in recent times
with the increase in official prying and snooping into the lives of private
individuals has reinforced support for the traditional privileges and no doubt
24
aided in the creation of new ones.
McCormick's conclusion with regard to these two outlooks is that no
broad policy on privileges is appropriate. He states that
[r]econciling interests in privacy and confidentiality with the needs of litigants
is not readily achieved in terms of broad categories; it calls for the finer touch
of the specific solution. A tool already at hand, though perhaps largely
unrecognized, consists of recognizing standing on the part of the possessor of
information to question the legitimacy of need for it in litigation, i.e., to raise
issues of relevancy in the broad sense.25
A demand for a plain showing of the benefit to be derived from the
divulgence by an unwilling witness seeking the protected silence of
privilege is the demand for a demonstration of relevancy of the testimony
or document at issue. As McCormick suggested, a more vigorous
challenge to relevancy of demanded information or documents may
resolve the conflict between protection of privacy and discovery of truth
without compromising either worthy objective.
II. NAACP v. Alabama
26In the case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the United
States Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion decided several significant
matters regarding the first amendment right to freedom of association. The
case arose in response to a discovery demand by the state's Attorney
General for membership lists of the Alabama NAACP resulting from
NAACP failure to comply with the state statute regulating the operation of
foreign corporations within the state. The United States Supreme Court
22. Id.
23. M. SLOUGH, FREEDOM AND REsPONSIBILITY (1969).
24. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 77 at 157.
25. Id. at 159.
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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reviewed the validity of an Alabama state court civil contempt order
against NAACP for refusing to divulge the lists. 27 The state statute in
question required foreign corporations, unless otherwise exempted, to file
a corporate charter with the Secretary of State and to designate an agent to
receive service of process. 2' That statute did not itself require the disclosure
of the names of members; a foreign corporation failing to comply with the
statute, however, was subject to a fine and its officers to criminal
prosecution.29
NAACP is a nonprofit organization, incorporated under the laws of
New York.30 The Certificate of Incorporation of NAACP indicates the
purposes of the organization:
[its] . . . principal objects . . . are voluntarily to promote equality of
rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among the citizens of the United
States; to advance the interest of colored citizens; to secure for them impartial
suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts,
education for their children, employment according to their ability, and
complete equality before the law.
These objectives are sought through chartered affiliates, which are
themselves unincorporated associations. The first such affiliate chartered
in Alabama was organized in 1918.32 In 1951 a regional office was opened
in Alabama with a staff of two supervisory persons and one clerical
person.33
In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama brought a suit in equity in
the state circuit court seeking to enjoin NAACP from continuing business
in the state because the association had never complied with the state's
foreign corporation qualification statute.3" The state complained that the
noncompliance of NAACP with the qualification statute was "causing
irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and
citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil
actions at law afford no adequate relief. . . .,35 The state court
immediately issued an ex parte restraining order prohibiting NAACP
from, pendente lite, "engaging in further activities within the State and
27. Id. at 451.
28. Id.
29. ALA. CODE §§ 10.192-.198 (1940).
30. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
31. Id. at 451 n.1, quoting NAACP's Certificate of Incorporation.
32. Id. at 452.
33. Id.
34. Id. The suit alleged that NAACP had opened a regional office and had organized affiliates in
the state, that it had recruited members and solicited contributions, that it had financially supported
black students seeking admission to the state university and had provided legal assistance to those
students, and that it had supported a black boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery, Alabama, which
sought to compel the seating of passengers without regard to race. One can imagine that it was the bus
boycott and the university admission efforts which dominated the more technical concerns with the
organization of NAACP. Memberships perhaps would have been tolerable. Activism was not.




forbidding it to take any steps to qualify itself to do business therein.
In moving to dismiss the restraining order, NAACP maintained that
it was exempt from the statute and, more importantly, that the state was
seeking to violate the rights of freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed
under the fourteenth amendment.37 Prior to the hearing on the NAACP
motion, the state requested the production of documents including bank
statements, leases, deeds, and records that identified "members" and
"agents" of the association. 38 These documents were alleged to be
necessary for preparation for the hearing since NAACP had denied that it
conducted intrastate business such that its organization would come
within the qualification statute. 39 The court ordered the production of
documents, including the membership lists, delaying the hearing on the
NAACP motion until the documents were made available.4 °
NAACP then answered the equity complaint admitting that its
activities were as alleged, that it had not qualified as the statute required,
but still contending that the statute did not apply to NAACP. NAACP
agreed to try to qualify under the statute, submitting the forms required, if
the order barring it from attempting to qualify were to be lifted. 41 NAACP
did not supply the demanded documents, however, and hence was held in
civil contempt and fined 10,000 dollars; the fine was to be increased to
100,000 dollars if NAACP failed to comply within five days.42
While NAACP produced most of the documents demanded within
the five-day period, it refused to turn over the membership lists,
maintaining that the state could not constitutionally compel that dis-
closure.43 Other motions in the state courts by NAACP were fruitless in
protecting the membership lists and the Alabama Supreme Court refused
certiorari to review the contempt judgment.44 The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari because of the constitutional issues
involved.45
The two primary holdings46 of the decision by the Supreme Court in
NAACP v. Alabama are that (1) an organization has standing to assert the
constitutional rights of its members of their behalf if to require the
members to do so for themselves "would result in nullification of the right
36. Id. at 452-53.





42. Id. at 453-54.
43. Id. at 454.
44. Id. The denial of certiorari was based first on the alleged insufficiency of petitioner's
allegations and second on procedural grounds.
45. 353 U.S. 972 (1957).
46. The initial issue addressed by the Court was jurisdictional, the State having unsuccessfully
contended that the petitioner had pursued the wrong appellate remedy. 357 U.S. at 454-55.
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at the very moment of its assertion ' 47 and (2) under the facts and
circumstances of the case the production of membership lists would violate
the members' constitutional right to freedom of association, "an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. 48
III. STANDING TO ASSERT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF ANOTHER
The Court's discussion of the standing issue is relatively cryptic but
nonetheless of continuing importance in the law. At first blush it would
seem that the constitutional right to freedom of association is a right that is
essentially personal. That is, it would certainly seem that an individual
whose associations are in question would be the only one qualified to
protect documents, information or testimony from the glare of public
scrutiny by way of the claim that the matter is under the umbrella of the
constitutional right to freedom of association. Yet, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the organization may assert that right on behalf of its49
members. It had been the continuing position of the Court that "parties
rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to themselves."50 This
particular posture by the Court reflected a broader view that constitutional
adjudication should be avoided whenever possible.51 The Court stated that
the principle is "not disrespected where constitutional rights of persons
who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively
vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the
Court. 5 2
An organization does have standing to assert constitutional rights of
its members when, as in the instant case, to deny the organization the
ability to assert the members' rights would be to deny that the individuals
could assert the rights. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to
withhold their connection with the Association despite the production order,
it is manifest that this right is properly assertable by the Association. To
require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in
nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the
appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in
every practical sense identical. The Association, which provides in its
constitution that "[a]ny person who is in accordance with [its] principles and
policies . . ." may become a member, is but the medium through which its
individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own
views. The reasonable likelihood that the Association itself through
47. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 468 (1958).
48. Id. at 468.
49. Id. at 458-59.





diminished financial support and membership may be adversely affected if
production is compelled is a further factor pointing towards our holding that
petitioner has standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its
members."
This reasoning consists of several criteria that the Court applied in this
case. The factors are: (1) whether the members would lose the right by
claiming it, (2) whether the members and the association are "in every
practical sense identical," (3) whether the association's constitution
specifies that membership indicates accord between the member's beliefs
and the association's principles, (4) whether the association's constitution
indicates that the association is a "medium" for the effective expression of
the member's views, and (5) whether disclosure of membership lists would
diminish financial support and/or the number of members. Whether these
criteria rise to the level of a "test" for standing to assert constitutional
rights on behalf of another is not clear from subsequent cases relying on
NAACP v. Alabama. 4 These factors may amount to a conclusive test or
may be merely some of the variables to which a court could look to adjudge
whether a party has standing to assert constitutional rights on behalf of
another.
These factors may not be fully comprehensible when considered
separately from the specific constitutional right at issue in this case,
namely freedom of association. In fact, it is readily apparent, for example,
that an individual's right to protection of a property interest against an
unconstitutional taking would not be affected by the revelation that the
individual was a member of an association that collectively owned the
property in question.55 Any danger of loss of one's freedom of association
by disclosure may be peculiar to that constitutional right. Self-nullification
of the right turns on the necessity of anonymity for freedom of association.
But is it a logically necessary feature of freedom of association that it
will self-nullify upon assertion? To the contrary, members of an
association could assert their rights to belong to an association in a
universe of tolerant peers and authorities. The assertion that one is a
member is not necessarily inconsistent with the freedom to be a member in
an association. The assertion of association membership is not logically
inconsistent with any other right or act, although, of course, one might well
criticize an individual for acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the
beliefs implied by association membership. Just the same, one might
criticize an individual for asserting two inconsistent beliefs, or for asserting
one belief and acting in a manner that implies or presupposes a belief quite
53. Id. at 459-60.
54. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
55. One could define a form of property ownership in such a way that anonymity was entailed.
That is to say, while property ownership does not entail anonymity, "anonymous property ownership"
would. But such could be said of any right which one has, i.e., if it were a right to anonymously do X,
now called the right to A, then one could not both do A and be forced to assert that one was doing A at
the same time.
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the contrary. In other words, while we might be displeased by the
assertions and behavior of individuals which suggest that their reliance on
inconsistent propositions, as in "I believe x" and "I believe not x," such
conduct does not create the same kind of logical puzzle as Bertrand
Russell's "This sentence is false. 56
Perhaps the self-nullification factor depends on a presupposed
anonymity requirement in association membership. It would be a logical
puzzle for Sam Spade to assert "I am Sam Spade" if it were a necessary
feature of being Sam Spade that he remain anonymous. This could not be a
problem simply of one who ought to remain anonymous but then blows his
own cover by revealing his identity. The logical puzzle could only arise in
the anonymity case if the one who revealed his own identity could not be
that individual and reveal his own identity. To reveal that you are who you
are does not seem to present a logical dilemma except in the most
extraordinary cases, if at all. In the same way, one who is a member of an
association could logically be a member of the association and desire that
he remain anonymous, and yet slip and reveal his own association
membership.
The threat of disclosure of association membership may be a function
of the nature of the constitutional guarantee to freedom of association.
What the first amendment guarantees is not just that we can be members of
some associations, but that we have the freedom to belong to those
associations to which we choose to belong. Without tying these ob-
servations to a particular analysis of "freedom," it can safely be said that
there is no logical inconsistency between being free to do Y and asserting
that "I am doing Y." It also does not seem to be the case that there is any
logical inconsistency between being free to do Y and being compelled to
assert that "I am doing Y." Nor is there any logical inconsistency between
the freedom of being a member of an organization and being compelled to
assert that you are a member of that organization.
If the assertion of the constitutional right to freedom of association is
threatened by self-nullification, that difficulty is one made in the practical
world of human affairs, not in the logic of the concepts. A member of
NAACP in Alabama in the 1950s, practically speaking, had the freedom to
belong to that association if that individual was not compelled to publicly
disclose his membership. Anonymity is not a logical feature of the freedom
of association; but in some circumstances, anonymity is a practical
necessity for the full exercise of freedom of association. It is the animosity
toward a given organization at a given time and place that threatens the
freedom to become a member of that organization. Hence, it is the
perception of that animosity that inhibits the freedom one might otherwise
have to join the organization. But for the animosity toward NAACP and
the fear of the possibility that one's membership could be disclosed, the
56. B. RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS (1903).
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freedom of association would remain whole. Thus, in a completely tolerant
universe where there was no animosity toward any organization, self-
disclosure of membership would not undercut one's freedom of
association. In a society in which no individual perceived hostility toward
any organization, freedom of association would not be touched by the
forced disclosure of one's membership. While the factor of self-
nullification-the destruction of one's right to freedom of association by
the very act of asserting it-may appear to be the Court's identification of a
logical relationship among the concepts, it is in fact an observation on the
practical considerations of hostility and fear and the effect of those
emotions on one's willingness to place oneself in jeopardy. 7
The remaining factors noted by the Court make it more evident that it
is the practical considerations that establish the context in which one's
freedom of association is legitimately asserted by another party. The
practical identity of the individual and the association, especially as
demonstrated by the association's constitution indicating that the
association is but a medium for the expression of the individual's beliefs
and specifying that membership indicates that the member's beliefs and the
association's principles are in accord, lends more of a gloss of propriety to
the association's assertion of constitutional rights on the member's behalf.
Superficially, the suggestion is that the identities are not wholly separate.
But more importantly, to the extent that the association's principles reflect
and reveal the member's beliefs, the mere identification of the fact of
membership is a disclosure of the member's beliefs. Such revelations of
members' beliefs about political and social change are not written on the
face of a swim club membership; but they are with respect to membership
in the Democratic Party or the Symbionese Liberation Army.
5 8
Hence, while it may appear that the Court was identifying freedom of
association as a constitutionally protected right that possesses the unique
property of self-nullifying upon its very assertion, that property is not a
logically necessary part of the right. Rather, the practical considerations of
the context in which an individual might most wish to assert the freedom of
association may be factually the context in which one would most like to
have one's associations not disclosed. The use of pseudonyms by plaintiffs
in matters of delicacy illustrates that an individual could assert a right and
still be protected from disclosure of the fact that he is asserting the right.
For the purposes of deciding standing of the party to assert that right, the
57. Perhaps on some philosophical views, were the world other than it is and people without fear
and hostility, certain logical incoherencies would emerge or fade, logic having no independent purity,
being rather an animal of human concepts. But the apparent elegance of the Court's proposition of self-
nullification assumes that this constitutional right has a logical character that is independent of the
factual context of human behavior.
58. This is not a claim that no particular political or social beliefs are suggested by membership
in a swim club. Prospective Justices of the Supreme Court as well as other candidates for sensitive
positions are sometimes embarrassed by the membership policies of the purportedly social
organizations to which they belong.
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Court's argument that anonymity may need to be preserved for the holder
of the right is not persuasive that someone other than the holder of the
right must assert the right.
It follows that in the discovery stages a demand for documents that
reveal the membership of an organization is not a production demand that
can be responded to only by the association. The individuals who consider
their freedom of association to be at risk by the production demand could
very well intervene in a Doe or Roe fashion to block the production.59
While the procedure is slightly more circuitous than that permitted by the
Court in NAACP v. Alabama, it would preserve the principle that the
holder of the constitutional right is the one who must assert it rather than
some third party on behalf of the holder of the right. Frustration of
discovery is a serious impediment to the just resolution of a matter under
litigation.60
Finally, with respect to the standing issue in NAACP v. Alabama, it
must be noted that the association's standing to assert the right on behalf of
the member is dependent upon the member's being entitled to assert the
right. The key paragraph begins with the proviso: "If petitioner's rank-
and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection
with the Association despite the production order. ,,61 Whether the
rank-and-file members are constitutionally permitted to withhold their
connection with the Association is a function of the analysis that the Court
performs on "freedom of association."
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The second major holding of the Court in NAACP v. Alabama was
that "the production order in the state litigation trespasses upon
fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 62 The incorporation of first amendment rights
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the protection
of those rights against actions by the states had already been decided in a
case a third of a century earlier.63 While first amendment rights seem to be
the central issue in this case, the operative language in the Court's
description of the member's rights does not refer to the first amendment
itself but rather only to the fourteenth amendment.64 The protected right is
59. The procedure for filing a case in a pseudonym is such that NAACP members could have
sued anonymously, according to Justice Blackmun in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
60. It should be noted that there is a significant difference between defendants who resist
discovery in a case such as NAA CP and plaintiffs who initiate the litigation and then refuse discovery.
The former is unwillingly in court while the latter chose to be. Surely a factor in that choice must be the
practicality and fairness of an adjudication when discovery is thwarted by the plaintiff.
61. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
62. Id. at 460.
63. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
64. See Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L.
REv. 730, 732 (1960).
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described and the implication of first amendment rights is strongly
suggested by the following passage:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this
Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus
between the freedom of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is
an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech .... 65
Not only is this language suggestive of a first amendment issue, the cases
cited by the Court in support of its position are all first amendment cases.66
Further language invites interpretation of this case as a first
amendment case. Specifically the Court states: "Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by an association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to association is subject to the
closest scrutiny. 67 And later: "In the domain of these indispensable
liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this
Court recognize that abridgment of such rights, even though unintended,
may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. 68
Subsequent cases construe NAA CP v. Alabama as a first amendment case
holding that the first amendment is applicable whether the beliefs sought
to be advanced " 'pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural
matters.' ,69 The Court also later held that "[o]ur decisions establish with
unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the
purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 70
The import of the right at issue is that the Court correspondingly
identified the right of freedom of association in a "close nexus" with the
freedoms of speech and assembly and then treated association as a
fundamental right, subjecting to the "closest scrutiny" any action by the
state that might curtail that right. 71 Thus, the Court applied the so-called
strict scrutiny test to the state's action. The state's action cannot be held to
be constitutional if it has the consequence of discouraging freedom of
association unless the state can show a compelling reason to do so. 72 The
Court described as not a "novel" perception that "compelled disclosure of
65. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations omitted).
66. Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,321 (1958); Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
67. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
68. Id. at 461.
69. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,231 n.28 (1977), quoting NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
70. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977).
71. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
72. Id. at 461-62.
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affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a
restraint on freedom of association" as the other forms of governmental
action previously found to be unconstitutional." Freedom of association
bears a vital relationship to privacy in one's association:
74
Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy
of particular beliefs is of the same order [as requiring the wearing of
identifying armbands]. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of associa-
tion particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.75
The nexus between privacy and freedom of association cannot simply
be assumed. In the NAACP case the "petitioner has made an
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of
its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility. '76 What NAACP succeeded in showing
was that there was fear on the part of its members of the public disclosure
of their association sufficient to affect their freedom to advocate certain
beliefs through association. Furthermore, the Court viewed the fear to be
rationally based on the reprisals that the members could well expect to
follow from their public identification." A showing that members
experience fear presumably is not sufficient to deter discovery of
membership lists. Rather, a showing that the members experience fear and
that the fear is well-grounded is necessary to place the burden on the state
to bring forward the justification for its discovery demand. One can infer
that the members' paranoia alone would not thwart discovery. As was
stated above, the hostility of the community and the fear of this hostility
jointly form the threshold to a justifiable claim to the protection of one's
privacy interests in one's associations.
A claim that it is the community's hostility rather than the acts of the
state that is repressive was not favorably received by the Court. It stated:
"The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for
it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the
production order that private action takes hold."78 An "innocent" act by
the state can be held unconstitutional if the milieu in the private sector
subjects individuals to hostility and reprisals for their membership in an
association. Proof of intent is not necessary if a causal relation exists
between the state's acts and the prohibited consequences.
The state can preserve its discovery demand or rehabilitate it from
73. Id. at 462.
74. Id. See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
75. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 462-63.
78. Id. at 463.
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apparent unconstitutionality by bringing forward compelling reasons for
it. The Court's rule on this matter is as follows:
The final question [is] whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in ob-
taining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the
deterrent effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on
the free exercise by petitioner's members of their constitutionally protected
right of association.'
The standard is that the " 'subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling.' "30 Alabama, therefore, was faced with presenting a
"justification" for its demand for NAACP membership lists. The state's
interest in the documents was: (1) "whether the character of petitioner and
its activities in Alabama had been such as to make petitioner subject to the
registration statute," and (2) "whether the extent of petitioner's activities
without qualifying suggested its permanent ouster from the State."8'
Rather than passing on the merits of the issues the Court stated that it
found that the membership lists had no bearing on those issues.82 The
Court held that the state had not shown interest in the membership lists
sufficient to "overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the
production order."
83
The Court provided some insight into what it was seeking in the way
of justification by the state in the course of distinguishing NAACP from
another case of notable similarity. In Bryant v. Zimmerman,84 the Court
upheld the interests of the state in the membership of an individual in a
New York chapter of the Ku Klux Klan. The state statute in question
required the filing of the constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations, oath of
membership and roster of members and officers by an unincorporated
association that demanded an oath as a prerequisite or condition of
membership, other than a labor union or a benevolent order.85
Furthermore, the New York statute provided a criminal misdemeanor
sanction for "[a]ny person who becomes a member of any such
corporation or association, or remains a member thereof, or attends a
meeting thereof, with knowledge that such corporation or association
has failed to comply . . ." with the statute.
86
The NAACP Court distinguished Bryant on two grounds: (1) New
York statutory enforcement against the Klan was justified by the
"particular character of the Klan's activities, involving acts of unlawful
79. Id.
80. Id. quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957).
81. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 465.
84. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id.
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intimidation and violence" 87 and (2) NAACP had made some effort to
comply with the requirements of Alabama's statute (at least it did under
the directive of the contempt citation), while the parties in Bryant refused
to furnish the state with any information.88 It is not clear why partial
compliance with the state's discovery demand in NAACP makes the
organization that much less subject to the force of the law. Perhaps the
Court took partial compliance as a good faith effort to do all that NAACP
felt it could. The organization then drew the line at the point necessary to
protect the constitutional rights of the rank-and-file members. The state
having failed to produce a "controlling" reason for access to the NAACP
membership list in particular, the right of freedom of association
prevailed. Refusal to comply with the New York statute in all respects
indicated a general recalcitrance on the part of the petitioner rather than
the selective and refined objection of NAACP.
The former reason for distinguishing Bryant is much more interesting.
The Court looked through the general freedom of association or speech to
the nature of the principles which the members espouse. That is, in Bryant
the Klan was said to believe in, express and act on principles of violence
and intimidation. In resisting the argument that the New York statute
failed to provide fourteenth amendment equal protection to different
classes the Court observed:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited
and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference
between the two classes of association shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make
the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and
conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence
of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal
association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that
this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods
and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the
people"; and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been-in existence for many
years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaints
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of
others. . .89
The Court singled out the Klan as an appropriate organization to lack the
right to protection of its freedom of association-not because of beliefs
that draw the members together-but because of the "manifest tendency"
of the organization to use its secrecy to cloak "acts and conduct" that are
"inimical to personal rights and public welfare."90 While NAACP did not
87. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958).
88. Id. at 466.




gather merely to share beliefs but to act in certain ways, the objectives of
NAACP were evaluated by the Court as more acceptable objectives than
those pursued by the Klan.
Hence, what distinguishes the freedoms of the members of the two
organizations is not the formal properties of right to speech and assembly
but the content of their respective beliefs. Perhaps this observation goes
too far. The acts themselves are distinguishable in that one organization is
willing to act violently while the other is not. But the Court's language is
"manifest tendency" to cloak its acts in secrecy that are inimical to personal
rights and public welfare. That is, the Court considers it proper to protect
members' freedom of association if the members do not have a tendency to
act contrary to personal rights and public welfare. Surely the belief
structure that suggests this tendency need not be actually manifested in the
violation of personal rights in fact. The Court thus must be distinguishing
between two tendencies or inclinations on the basis of the content of the
beliefs espoused by the members rather than the acts that those members
have actually performed.
The implications of the Court's analysis in NAACP of freedom of
association suggest that protection of membership and membership lists is
available only if (1) the association in question is one engaged in advocacy
of beliefs whether political, economic, religious or cultural; (2) the freedom
of association is therefore in close nexus with freedoms of speech and
assembly; (3) the intrusion into the privacy of association meets a strict
scrutiny test-the complaining party has shown justifiable fear of
disclosure in its members and the discovering party has failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest in the information; (4) the party refusing
discovery has made a good faith effort to comply with discovery; (5) the
information does not seem to be relevant to the matter being litigated; (6)
the disclosure of membership is repressive because of the state's own
actions or the consequences of the state's actions; and (7) the Court does
not find the objectives of the organization or the conduct of its members
indicative of a tendency to act in a way inimical to personal rights or public
welfare.
While NAACP v. Alabama is a monumental case in the area of
protection of privacy in one's associations; it was not the last word on the
subject. Even within the narrow confines of that particular fact pattern the
case came before the United States Supreme Court three more times before
being resolved. In 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Court
reversed the contempt judgment without reaching the merits of the
restraining order.9' The Alabama Supreme Court on remand affirmed the
contempt judgment. The United States Supreme Court in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson92 remanded again having found that the state
91. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
92. 360 U.S. 240 (1959).
19801
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
court had shifted its premises between its two decisions. The Alabama
State Supreme Court did not readily present NAACP with an opportunity
for a hearing on its case and so the Association initiated a suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging
violation of constitutional rights and seeking an injunction against the
restraining order. The action was dismissed by the district court,93 with the
court of appeals in turn holding that the matter belonged in the state courts
but vacating the district court's judgment and remanding with instructions
"to permit the issues to be determined with expedition in the State
courts. 9 4 The United States Supreme Court took jurisdiction for the third
time in 1961, ordering that a trial of the issues in the case begin no later
than January 2, 1962, on the matter of NAACP's motion to dissolve the
state's June 1, 1956, restraining order.95 The state circuit court held the
required hearing and found on December 29, 1961, that NAACP was in
continuing violation of the state's foreign corporation qualification
statute. The circuit court permanently enjoined NAACP and its affiliates
from doing business of any kind in Alabama or attempting to qualify to do
so. The Alabama Supreme Court, relying on a procedural point, affirmed
that decision. 96 The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari
and concluded finally, again in a unanimous single opinion decision, that
[t]he judgment below must be reversed. In view of the history of this case, we
are asked to formulate a decree for entry in the state courts which will assure
the Association's right to conduct activities in Alabama without further
delay. While such a course undoubtedly lies within this Court's power,
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304, we prefer to follow our usual
practice and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Alabama for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Such proceedings should
include the prompt entry of a decree, in accordance with state procedures,
vacating in all respects the permanent injunction order issued by the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, and permitting the Association to
take all steps necessary to qualify it to do business in Alabama. Should we
unhappily be mistaken in our belief that the Supreme Court of Alabama will
promptly implement this disposition, leave is given the Assocation to apply to
this Court for further appropriate relief.97
To the extent that courts reflect a community's hostility towards a given
association, that is, under precisely those circumstances in which the
members most need their privacy guaranteed, protracted litigation such as
that displayed in the NAACP cases may be necessary to insure the
protection of constitutional rights.
93. NAACP v. Gallion, 190 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
94. NAACP v. Gailion, 290 F.2d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1961).
95. NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 (1961).
96. NAACP v. Alabama, 150 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1963).
97. 377 U.S. 288, 310 (1964).
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V. THE MEANINGS OF NAACP v. ALABAMA
TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Douglas Dissents
On the same day that the Supreme Court issued NAA CPv. Alabama
the case was relied upon in a manner that turned out to be prophetic of a
frequent use. Justice Douglas in many eloquent dissents appealed to the
absolute right of freedom of association that he maintained was
established in the NAACP case. Chronologically first among those
dissenting opinions is that of Beilan v. Board of Public Education.9 In that
case a public school teacher in Philadelphia had been questioned by the
school superintendent concerning his communist affiliations and
associations and had refused to answer. The superintendent warned the
petitioner that his refusal might lead to his dismissal; following an
administrative hearing dealing with the teacher's incompetency, as
evidenced by his refusal to answer the questions, he was dismissed. The
Supreme Court held that the dismissal did not violate the petitioner's
fourteenth amendment rights to due process. Justice Burton wrote the
opinion for the Court. Justice Douglas was joined in his dissent by Justice
Black. The lesson of NAACP was stated pointedly:
[G]overnment has no business penalizing a citizen merely for his beliefs or
associations. It is government action that we have here. It is government
action that the Fourteenth and First Amendments protect against. We
emphasized in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, decided this day . . . that freedom
to associate is one of those liberties protected against governmental action
and that freedom from "compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups en-
gaged in advocacy" is vital to that constitutional right. We gave protection in
the N.A.A.C.P. case against governmental probing into political activities
and associations of one dissident group of people. We should do the same
here.
99
Justice Douglas read NAACP broadly. For him the case stood for a
general proposition of nonintrusion by government into the beliefs of
citizens.
Also dissenting in Beilan, Justice Brennan drew the scope of NAACP
more narrowly. He construed the holding of NAACP to support the view
that when state actions touch important political rights, close judicial
scrutiny by the Court is necessary. He stated, in part:
[A]s a generality . . . government is never at liberty to be arbitrary in its
re1fations with its citizens, and close judicial scrutiny is essential when State
action infringes on the right of a man to be accepted in his community, to
express his ideas in an atmosphere of calm decency, and to be free of the dark
stain of suspicion and distrust of his loyalty on account of his political beliefs
98. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
99. Id. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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and associations. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama . . . decided this day. It is these
rights which stand before the bar today, and it is in the awareness of their
implications that these cases must be decided.00
Thus, on the day of the NAA CP decision, at least, Justices Douglas, Black
and Brennan believed the case stood for a generalized protection from
governmental imposition on the individual because of the individual's
beliefs. The Beilan case did not deal with membership lists or production of
documents. Beilan did not have to make an antecedent showing of
legitimate fear of reprisals for his associations since he had already been
dismissed from employment. What was at issue was not the association to
which he belonged but the fact that he refused to answer whether he was a
member of a certain class of associations.' °'
In both his majority opinions and dissents, Justice Douglas raised the
banner of the NAACP case. In a brief opinion by Justice Douglas, the
Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of Louisiana state statutes that,
inter alia, required the filing of lists of officers and members of the NAACP
with the Secretary of State of Louisiana. 0 2 The state had brought the
action to enjoin the NAACP from doing business in Louisiana for failure
to comply with this requirement. Some NAACP affiliates in Louisiana had
already complied and there was evidence before the Court that members
identified on those filings had been subjected to economic reprisals.0 3 The
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the statutes was to
become a permanent injunction if, on hearing in the lower courts, it
became apparent that disclosure of membership lists would result in
reprisals against and hostility towards the members.0 4
The broader reading of NAACP substantially underwrote several
Douglas dissents in the early 1960s on the unpopular subject of subversive
activities.' °5 The Court held in Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Board'0 6 that the demand for registration of
party members was not unconstitutional, distinguishing NAACP and
related cases on the ground that the magnitude of the interests protected
by registration satisfied the requirement that the state have a substantial or
100. Id. at 418-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Perhaps the results in Beilan confirm that an individual is awkwardly placed if he must
assert his constitutional right not to reveal his associational membership-a basic premise of the
standing argument in NAACP, 357 U.S. 449. It was Beilan's refusal to answer, the equivalent of his
assertion of his constitutional right not to have to disclose his associations, that resulted in the reprisal.
102. Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
103. Id. at 295-96.
104. Id. at 296.
105. In one term, October 1961, Justice Douglas dissented in three cases in which he cited
NAACP, for basic propositions of law. Two are discussed in the text, but it also should be noted that
Justice Douglas dissented from the dismissal of the appeal in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961),
taking the position that a controversy did exist in the challenge to the Connecticut contraceptive statute
that merited adjudication of a constitutional issue. Citing NAACP, Justice Douglas stated," 'Liberty'
is a conception that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees." Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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compelling interest to access to membership lists.10 7 In his dissent, Justice
Douglas contended that freedom of association is in "the bundle of First
Amendment rights,"'0 8 and that:
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, . . . the Association was allowed to assert its
members' constitutional rights: "If petitioner's rank-and-file members are
constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection with the Association
despite the production order, it is manifest that this right is properly
assertable by the Association. To require that it be claimed by the members
themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of
assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it
and its members are in every practical sense identical." We dealt there with a
Negro group asserting the First Amendment rights of its members. The
members, it was argued, would be harassed if their names were disclosed and
that harassment would abridge their First Amendment rights. We agreed
with that view, and held that N.A.A.C.P. could not be forced to disclose to
Alabama its membership lists. We did not, I assume, write a rule good for that
day only. Nor did I think we wrote only for Negro groups.'09
Though Justice Douglas usually concerned himself with the substantive
right of freedom of association and not the standing issue, when it
appeared to him that harassment of members could be presumed he would
shift the focus to the issue of standing to assert the right, as he did in
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board.
His position on the standing issue appeared to be one ultimately of
indifference. The least concern in freedom of association was potential
injury to the corporation itself, or so Douglas intimated in a separate
opinion in yet another case. For abstention reasons the Court reversed,
vacated and remanded trespass convictions for a sit-in.10 In Appendix I
to his separate opinion for the result of reversing and dismissing the
indictment Justice Douglas stated:
At times a corporation has standing to assert the constitutional rights of its
members, as otherwise the rights peculiar to the members as individuals
might be lost or impaired. Thus in NAACP v. Alabama, the question was
whether the N.A.A.C.P. as a membership corporation, could assert on behalf
of its members a right personal to them to be protected from compelled
disclosure by the state of their affiliation with it. In that context we said the
N.A.A.C.P. was "the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and
its members are in every practical sense identical." We felt, moreover, that to
deny the N.A.A.C.P. standing to raise the question and to require it to be
claimed by the members themselves "would result in nullification of the right
at the very moment of its assertion." Those were the important reasons
governing our decision, the adverse effect of disclosure on the N.A.A.C.P.
itself being only a make-weight. 1'
107. Id. at 93-94.
108. Id. at 171 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
110. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
111. Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., in a separate opinion joined by Goldberg, J.) (citations omitted).
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This candid observation reinforces the conclusion that for Justice
Douglas, in particular, NAACP stands for the first amendment
constitutional protection of information regarding one's associations. The
significance of NAACP for him is not in the technicalities of the issue of
standing of the association itself.
Whether members of an organization justifiably feared disclosure of
their membership was a criterion that the Court has construed both
broadly and narrowly. This criterion is part of the consideration of the
well-being of the corporation itself, which Justice Douglas lightly
dismissed as makeweight.' 2 In Talley v. California'3 the Court held that a
city statute which prohibited the distribution of handbills that did not
identify the person who prepared and distributed them was void on its face
and reversed Talley's conviction. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
stated that "[s]tates may not compel members of groups engaged in the
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified . . . The reason for
those holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter per-
fectly peaceful discussions of public matters . . ,.14 In the Talley case a
dissenting opinion by Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker reminded
the Court of the burden that a petitioner such as Talley had to bear:
Unlike N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, . . . which is relied upon, there is neither
allegation nor proof that Talley or any group sponsoring him would suffer
"economic reprisals, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion [or]
other manifestations of public hostility." . . . Talley makes no showing
whatever to support his contention that a restraint upon his freedom of
speech will result from the enforcement of the ordinance. The existence of
such a restraint is necessary before we can strike the ordinance down.115
While the Court gradually drifted away from looking for injury to the
association itself, a defined position regarding the need to show likelihood
of harm to members did not emerge for some time.
In the same period, Douglas opinions gave shape to the freedom of
association that reflected his view of the NAACP case. Clearly following
the precedent of NAACP, the case of Bates v. Little Rock n 6 held that
individual officials of NAACP could not be required to divulge
membership lists under the requirements of municipal occupational
license tax ordinances. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice
Stewart, recited the teachings of NAACP v. Alabama. The right to
peaceable assembly, like freedom of speech and a free press, lie at the
foundation of a government based upon consent of an informed
citizenry."' Freedom of association is protected by the due process
112. Id.
113. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
114. Id. at 65.
115. Id. at 69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
116. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
117. Id. at 522-23.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment."' These freedoms are protected
against both obvious and subtle governmental attack.119 The Court
recognized a "vital relationship" between freedom to associate and privacy
of association. 20 When a group espouses dissident beliefs, privacy in
association may be indispensable to preserve freedom of association.'
21
The Court held that the record showed that compulsory disclosure of
NAACP membership lists would "work a significant interference with the
freedom of association of their members."'122 Public disclosure had been
followed by harassment. 123 The Court noted that the "repressive effect,
while in part the result of private attitudes and pressures, was brought to
bear only after the exercise of governmental power had threatened to force
disclosure of the members' names."'124 The state showed no compelling
reasons that would subordinate the interests of the members. 125 Justice
Stewart's opinion seems forceful enough. Yet Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion that suggests a desire to
elevate the freedom of association to an even more protected status than
perhaps it had previously held.
[W]e believe, as we indicated in United States v. Rumely, . . . that First
Amendment rights are beyond abridgment either by legislation that directly
restrains their exercise or by suppression or impairment through harassment,
humiliation, or exposure by government. One of those rights, freedom of
assembly, includes of course freedom of association; and it is entitled to no
less protection than any other First Amendment right as N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, and De Jonge v. Oregon, . . . hold. These are principles
applicable to all people under our Constitution irrespective of their race,
color, politics, or religion. That is, for us, the essence of the present opinion of
the Court. 26
The language "beyond abridgment" indicates that a statute or ordinance
that threatens to impose on free speech and associated rights is
unconstitutional even without the sequence of tests that requires a showing
by the claimant that the fear of harassment is justifiable.
B. Effects of the Douglas Dissents
It was clear to the Court, and to Justice Douglas in particular, that
NAACP membership in the South in the 1950's was dangerous. It also
seemed to have been clear to the Court that the goals and objectives of
NAACP were such as to be encouraged. Thus, while the Court required a





123. Id. at 524.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 528 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
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showing of justifiable fear of harassment and reprisal before giving the
protection to the freedom of association that could be overcome only by
compelling state interest, these features were so prominent in the NAACP
cases that the structure of the test slipped away. Two effects of that habit of
thought can be found in the 1960s cases. The first is that the reasoning
transferred to other unpopular groups quite readily for Justice Douglas,
reading NAACP as broadly as he did, and it transferred grudgingly if at all
to "subversive" groups for much of the rest of the Court. The second effect
is that the notion of protected "speech" expanded surprisingly in civil
rights cases from this era.
1. Not for Negroes Only
As to the first effect, Justice Douglas was heard early on to say that the
NAACP principle was not for Negroes only.127 In Uphaus v. Wyman, 128
the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction a case on appeal in which an
individual was jailed for civil contempt. The case concerned the
defendant's refusal to obey a state court order to produce the names of
people who attended a summer camp that the state Attorney General was
investigating as possibly including "subversive" persons. Two dissenting
opinions were written, one by Justice Black with Justices Warren and
Douglas joining and the other by Justice Douglas with Justices Warren
and Black joining. Justice Black's opinion stated in essence that the
imprisonment of Uphaus was
another of that ever-lengthening line of cases where people have been sent to
prison and kept there for long periods of their lives because their beliefs were
inconsistent with the prevailing views of the moment. I believe the First and
Fourteenth Amendments were intended to prevent any such imprisonments
in this country.1
29
The Douglas dissent laid out several reasons for noting jurisdiction, the
most vigorously argued of which was the NAACP precedent. After
quoting NAACP at length, 30 Justice Douglas noted that Bates v. Little
127. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 185 (196 1) (Douglas J.,
dissenting); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,528 (1960) (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring); Beilan
v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 414 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. 364 U.S. 388 (1960).
129. Id. at 400 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J.).
130.
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of
governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the particular
constitutional rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. When referring to the varied forms of
governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly, it said in American
Communications Assn. v. Douds, [339 U.S. 382], at 402: "A requirement that adherents of
particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is
obviously of this nature." Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in
advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs. Cf. United States v.
Rumely, [345 U.S. 41], at 56-68 (concurring opinion).
364 U.S. 388, 405-06 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
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Rock13 ' had also held that an individual custodian of records did not have
to release membership lists to city officials. He repeated that the principle
of NAACP is not a rule for Negroes only.132 But Justice Douglas bypassed
the requirement that the claimant show the likelihood of injury if the
information were to be divulged. Rather, Justice Douglas pummeled the
Court with rhetorical questions. "Can there be any doubt that harassment
of members of World Fellowship, Inc., in the climate prevailing among
New Hampshire's law-enforcement officials will likewise be severe?"'
133
And again, "Can there be any doubt that its members will be as closely
pursued as might be members of N.A.A.C.P. in some communities?"'
13 4
The first amendment protections extend to communists as well as NAACP
members. 31 Since Bates and Uphaus both contained the issue of an
individual refusing to disclose membership lists, the Court ought to have
taken jurisdiction in Uphaus, for as Justice Douglas put it, "[w]e cannot
administer justice with an even hand if we allow Bates to go free and
Uphaus to languish in prison."
13 6
As the number of "subversive" activities cases increased before the
Court and as they were decided contrary to what Justice Douglas
apparently saw as the unmistakable and broad mandate of NAACP, the
Douglas concurrences and dissents blossomed into full-blown speeches,
veritable treatises of the history of the Constitution and diverse theories of
government. These concurrences and dissents do not lack in eloquence.
Nor does it seem that they lacked a persuasive effect on Justice Douglas'
brethren as time wore on. In Scales v. United States,137 the petitioner was
convicted under the Smith Act for being an "active" member of an
organization-the Communist Party of the United States-that ad-
vocated the violent overthrow of the government. Justice Douglas waxed
both historical and theoretical in his dissenting opinion. Imbedded in this
dissent is the idea that freedom of association is like an absolute, if not
actually an absolute, right. 8 His opinion stated, in part:
Of course, government can move against those who take up arms against it.
Of course, the constituted authority has the right of self-preservation. But we
deal in this prosecution of Scales only with the legality of ideas and beliefs,
not with overt acts. The Court speaks of the prevention of "dangerous
behavior" by punishing those "who work to bring about that behavior." That
formula returns man to the dark days when government determined what
131. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
132. 364 U.S. 388, 406 (1960).
133. Id. at 407. Note 3 from this passage states:
The Attorney General of New Hampshire in the motion to dismiss in this case states, "Those
who voluntarily and knowingly appear with and otherwise act in concert with Communists or
former Communists in America cannot possibly have any reasonable right of privacy in
regard to such activities ... 
134. Id. at 407.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 408.
137. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
138. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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behavior was "dangerous" and then policed the dissidents for tel-tale signs of
advocacy . .139
The development of a balancing test between first amendment rights and
the interests of the state had become an index of erosion in the status of the
Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas wrote:
In recent years we have been departing, I think, from the theory of
government expressed in the First Amendment. We have too often been
"balancing" the right of speech and association against other values in society
to see if we, the judges, feel that a particular need is more important than the
Bill of Rights. . . .This approach, which treats the commands of the First
Amendment as "no more than admonitions of moderation" (see Hand, The
Spirit of Liberty (1960 ed.), p. 278) runs counter to our prior decisions.140
To reject the balancing test is ultimately to make first amendment rights,
including freedom of association, impervious to any governmental
intrusion unless and until an overt criminal act issues from the beliefs. That
only criminal conduct can justify governmental inquiry into the privacy of
one's beliefs and associations is further elaborated in Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee. 14' He observed that "the right of association has become a part
of the bundle of rights protected by the First Amendment. . . , and the
need for a pervasive right of privacy against government intrusion has been
recognized, though not always given the recognition it deserves. ' 42 In an
extended footnote, Justice Douglas indicated what he considered the
appropriate scope of this privacy:
Whether the problem involves the right of an individual to be let alone in the
sanctuary of his home or his right to associate with others for the attainment
of lawful purposes, the individual's interest in being free from governmental
interference is the same, and, except for the limited situation where there is
"probable cause" for believing that he is involved in a crime, the government's
disability is equally complete. 143
Justice Douglas insisted that if a group engaged in criminal conduct it
could be prosecuted and its members could be investigated.1 44 No belief
can in and of itself permit government intrusion. "Government can
intervene only when belief, thought, or expression moves into the realm of
action that is inimical to society."'
45
There is no doubt that some commentators find such a position
repugnant to the rationale for first amendment rights. It has been argued
that structural analysis of the Constitution will reveal what history cannot,
139. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 270 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 270-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
141. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
142. Id. at 569 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 569 n.7 (Douglas, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 571 (Douglas, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 573 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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namely the basic meaning of the first amendment. 146 BeVier agrees with
other commentators that "the constitutional process of self-government
provides an indispensable clue to the meaning of the first amendment.' 47
That conclusion is broadened to the notion that "the amendment protects
the process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to
which our representatives must govern.' 148 BeVier derives from these
concepts the position that
to read the amendment as protecting speech that advocates forcible
overthrow of the government or the violation of duly enacted law, however,
would distort the amendment's fundamental principle. . . . The basis for
excluding subversive advocacy or incitement to unlawful action from first
amendment protection is thus not that such speech is harmful in itself or that
it lacks social utility. . . .Rather, these kinds of speech are excluded because
to include them would be fundamentally inconsistent with the amendment's
underlying constitutional principle, because they necessarily imply processes
of decision making wholly antithetical to the process implied by the structure
of the Constitution.
49
Attractive though BeVier's view may be for its theoretical elegance, the
course that the Court followed was to extend the first amendment pro-
tection of freedom of association to membership in "subversive"
organizations. The Court did this in the context of analyzing what
behavior was to be considered acts of speech.
2. Political Speech Acts
While the Court debated whether the protection of freedom of
association that was so evidently deserved by NAACP was equally
deserved by Communists, the domain of protected speech by members of
NAACP was expanding. In a most notable case, NAACPv. Button,150 the
Court held to be unconstitutional a Virginia statute that outlawed
"solicitation" of legal business. NAACP challenged the statute because it
infringed "the right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to
associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for
infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights.
. ,,15 The right to associate sheltered the form of expression that the
statute held to be illegal. Thus, NAACP contended that "the activities of
the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of
expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments ... . The Court took the position that certain actions
146. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978).
147. Id. at 309.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 309-11.
150. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
151. Id. at 428.
152. Id. at 428-29.
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were forms of political expression and were thereby protected. Citing
NAACP v. Alabama, the Court stated that "there is no longer any doubt
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected certain forms of
orderly group activity."1 53 For NAACP, at least, litigation is political
expression, as the Court stated:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality
of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of
the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political
expression. 5
4
The opinion of the Court disavowed the defense of the Virginia statute
that its only purpose was insuring high professional standards. 55 In
Button the Court set out a principle that "a State may not, under the guise
of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights." 56 In
NAACP v. Alabama the principle announced was that "[I]n the domain of
these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the
decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of such rights, even
though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of
governmental action."' 
57
Both the purpose of limiting and the effect of limiting first amendment
rights were disallowed in Bates v. Little Rock. 5 8 Therefore, in three closely
analogous cases decided in a period of less than five years, the Court
denounced state action that ignored, unintentionally abridged, pur-
posefully limited or effectively limited first amendment rights of freedom
of association. The dust is still settling on the necessity of showing intent to
discriminate. "9
In addition to the matter of purpose, intent or effect of state action in
violation of first amendment rights, the Court was also struggling with the
breadth of action that could be considered within the scope of the first
amendment. As the Court held in Button, following the reasoning of
NAACP v. Alabama, orderly group activity including solicitation of legal
cases is encompassed by first amendment protection. 60 Dissenting
Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart resisted the expansion of protected
activity in Button. The dissent allowed that under the authority of NAACP
153. Id. at 430.
154. Id. at 429.
155. Id. at 438-39.
156. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
157. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (emphasis added).
158. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
159. Justice Douglas bristled early against intentional segregation but also embraced the
principle that motive does not matter when segregation is the effect. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 61-62 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,428-29(1963); NAACP v. AlabamaexreL Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
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v. Alabama, Bates v. Little Rock and Thomas v. Collins, "[f]reedom of
expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his
mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his
fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective.'' While not
abhorring litigation as a way of resolving disputes, the dissent argued that
to declare that litigation is a form of conduct that may be associated with
political expression does not resolve this case. Neither the First Amendment
nor the Fourteenth constitutes an absolute bar to government regulation in
the fields of free expression and association. This Court has repeatedly held
that certain forms of speech are outside the scope of the protection of those
Amendments, and that, in addition, "general regulatory statutes, not
intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
unfettered exercise, are permissible when they have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests. . . ... The problem in each such
case is to weigh the legitimate interest of the State against the effect of the
regulation on individual rights.
162
Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart resisted the treatment of first
amendment rights as "absolute." Part of that resistance consisted of
refusing to extend the protection from the sphere of pure speech to conduct
as speech. They wrote "[b]ut as we move away from speech alone and into
the sphere of conduct-even conduct associated with speech or resulting
,, 163
from it-the area of legitimate governmental interest expands. And the
implication for them of that view in the case of Button was that "litigation,
whether or not associated with the attempt to vindicate constitutional
rights, is conduct; it is speech plus.'
16 4
Comparison of the majority and dissenting views in Button illustrates
the differing interpretations of the form of "expression" that the authority
of NAACP v. Alabama staked out as protected. The protection afforded
by NAACP was being stretched in two directions. First, the language of
the case legitimized the protection of freedom of association from
inhibitory effects of state action, even if those effects were not intended. 1
65
Second, the language of the case legitimized the protection of a variety of
forms of expression in advocacy. Those forms of expression have included
promotion of litigation 166 and sit-ins.
167
The division in the Court regarding the appropriate rationale for the
protection of civil rights activists in the 1960s is poignantly displayed in
Brown v. Louisiana.168 Louisiana libraries were racially segregated and
161. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,452 (1963) (Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
162. Id. at 453 (Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 454 (Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
164. Id. at 455 (Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
165. The protection in NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), was from the
harm that could arise from the private sector once the state forced disclosure of the membership lists.
166. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
167. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146(1964).
168. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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petitioner and others entered a library requesting a book. Brown was told
the book was not in but would be sent. It was in fact eventually sent to a
"Blue" bookmobile, one specifically reserved for use by blacks. When he
was told the book was not available, Brown and those with him staged a
peaceful sit-in at the library. They were arrested within ten to fifteen
minutes of beginning the sit-in and convicted of breach of the peace. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions. Justice Fortas,
joined by Justices Warren and Douglas, wrote for the Court in the vein of a
broad reading of first amendment protection.
We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech
and of assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. The Constitution of the State of Louisiana reiterates these
guaranties. See Art. I §§ 3, 5. As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights
are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of
action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to
protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has
every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities ...
Accordingly, even if accused action were within the scope of the statutory
instrument, we would be required to assess the constitutional impact of its
application, and we would have to hold that the statute cannot constitutional-
ly be applied to punish petitioners' actions in the circumstances of this case. 69
Justice White concurred in the result but reasoned that it was normal to
remain in a library for ten minutes and thus petitioners' activities were an
authorized use of the library. Justice Brennan also concurred in the result
but declined to decide whether the actual conduct was protected,
maintaining that it was sufficient to decide that the conduct was arguably
constitutionally protected and not "hard-core" conduct obviously
prohibited under any construction of the breach of peace statute.170 Justice
Brennan concluded that the breach of peace statute was overly broad and
that the convictions therefore had to be reversed.1 7 1 Clearly, the Court did
not have a unified position with regard to the protection of actions within
the scope of the first amendment.
172
The extent to which one wants to include action within the protected
sphere of the first amendment seems to relate to (1) what theory of the first
amendment one espouses, (2) whether the first amendment is thought to be
"absolute," and (3) what beliefs or opinions are the subject of the speech. It
has already been shown, for example, that a court that will protect a broad
spectrum of actions of advocacy by the NAACP will not protect a very
restricted realm of speech or non-speech in the context of investigation of
169. Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 147-48 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 145.
172. See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); BeVier, The First




subversive organizations.173 Refusal to reveal one's associations was not
protected when the associations were "subversive."' 74 Though Justice
Douglas frequently characterized first amendment protection as an
"absolute" right, the majority of the Court's opinions seem instead to rely
on the view that it is proper to balance the state's interest in the information
against the importance of the freedom of association.
71
Although there is dispute whether a theory of the first amendment is
feasible, two distinct postures demonstrate the relation between theory
and the scope of first amendment protection. Emerson's widely recognized
theory is that the function of freedom of expression in a democratic society
is found in the values of that society. Specifically the values that Emerson
notes are that
[m]aintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a
method of securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the balance
between stability and change in the society.
This view leads Emerson to discuss the first amendment in terms of
freedom of expression and to distinguish "expression" that is protected
from "action" that may not be. It is his view that "the starting point for any
legal doctrine must be to fix this line of demarcation."1 77 The distinction
for Emerson between expression and action is a "question of whether the
harm attributable to the conduct is immediate and instantaneous, and
whether it is irremediable except by punishing and thereby preventing the
conduct."'78 As a basic implication of his theory, Emerson identifies the
principle that "it is not a general measure of the individual's right to
freedom of expression that any particular exercise of that right may be
thought to promote or retard other goals of the society.' ' 179 It is a further
implication of his view that the theory "rests upon a fundamental
distinction between belief, opinion, and communication of ideas on the
one hand, and different forms of conduct on the other, . . . [a]
distinction . . . between 'expression' and 'action.' ,,"0 From the
theoretical position of Emerson, therefore, the first amendment protects
173. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protecting solicitation of legal cases);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (refusing to reverse a contempt of Congress citation
for an individual who refused to answer questions by a subcommittee of the House of Committee on
Un-American Activities).
174. E.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
175. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,262 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting);Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
176. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YArx L.J. 877, 878-79
(1963).
177. Id. at 917.
178. Id.
179. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 8 (1970).
180. Id.
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not only speech per se but all of what we might otherwise call "action" that
communicates ideas even if that expression might retard other goals of the
society.
In high contrast to Emerson's is the position of BeVier.' 8' As a basic
postulate, BeVier states that "the [first] amendment protects the process of
forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which our
representatives must govern."' 182 It follows from this postulate that it is
perverse to read the amendment as protecting speech that advocates the
violent overthrow of the government or violation of duly enacted law.183
While BeVier grants Emerson the "intuitive appeal" of the value of self-
fulfillment, 8 4 he rejects it as a first amendment principle.'85 Finding no
"principled distinction" between expression and action, 18 6 BeVier accuses
Emerson of begging the question on the judgment in important cases
regarding what constitutes self-fulfilling expression and what is action"'-
that is, what human activity can be regulated by the state and what cannot.
The argument has not been settled among commentators on the
distinction between expression and action, and the course of the many first
amendment decisions by the Supreme Court evidences a continuing
fluidity in the importance of the distinction. The principle of law did
develop, however, that an overly broad federal, state, or municipal statute
was likely to be unconstitutional even though it regulated action or
conduct, since it could be applied in such a way as to suppress freedom of
association."' The balance of state interest against individual first
amendment rights was struck against an unlimited variety of conduct in a
draft card burning case. 189 The Court even came to hold the view that a
distinction had to be made between speech that advocated violence and
"advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action . . . likely to incite or produce such action."' 90 Advocating
violence is therefore within the scope of first amendment protection. A
18 1. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. Rv. 299 (1978).
182. Id. at 309.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 318.
185. Id..
186. Id. at 320.
187. Id.
188. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). This general principle was stated by Justice Black,
writing for the Court:
A state statute . . . regulating conduct-patrolling and marching-as distinguished from
speech, would in my judgment be constitutional, subject only to the condition that if such a
law had the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of speech, press, or religion, it would be
unconstitutional if under the circumstances it appeared that the State's interest in suppressing
the conduct was not sufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in engaging in conduct
closely involving his First Amendment freedoms.
Id. at 577.
189. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
190. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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distinction has been drawn by the Court between being a member of an
organization and having the specific intent to do an illegal act. Thus, in
Elfrandt v. Russell,'1" the Court struck down as overbroad a statute
requiring an oath that would be falsely sworn if taken by one who belonged
to a "subversive" organization. The Douglas opinion, again relying on
NAACP v. Alabama, stated that "[a] law which applies to membership
without the 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization
infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms."'9 2 Other "subversive
activities" statutes and investigations have been held unconstitutional for
overbreadth.' 93 In the development of each of these propositions of
protection of first amendment rights and freedom of association, NA A CP
v. Alabama and its progeny have played a role.
Once the Court worked its way out of the grim era of the witch-hunts
for subversives, the principles of NAACP can be seen to flower in a
number of areas. In the area of labor organization the Court has found
protection of picketing, even by consumers at a secondary distribution
point. 94 Labor unions have been acknowledged to have standing to sue on
behalf of the union members.' 95 Forced participation in a union, however,
violates freedom of association.196 Standing as discussed in NAACP has
been both broadly' 97 and narrowly construed.' 98 The narrow construction
represented a return to the NAACP requirement of a showing or at least
an allegation of injury to the organization itself.' 99 The Court continued
the protection of litigation as a form of advocacy in a case of an attorney
informing women of their rights after they were sterilized as a condition of
receiving public assistance. 20 0 The civil rights objectives of the organiza-
tion were within the protection of the association for advancement of
beliefs and ideas announced in Button.2 °'
In one year the Court decided two cases concerning revelation of one's
"subversive" associations as a prerequisite to admission to the bar. One
case, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,20 2 held that it was a violation of first
amendment rights to condition admission to the bar on the answer to the
191. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
192. Id. at 19.
193. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
194. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). In Justice
Black's concurrence, the first amendment protection was said to extend to nonprotected conduct when
it was intertwined with constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 77-78.
195. National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963).
196. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
197. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
198. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
199. Id. at 511.
200. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
201. Id. at 427-29.
202. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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question inquiring into one's political memberships. Almost inexplicably,
in Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, °3 the Court found that it
was not a violation of one's first amendment rights to be required by the
New York Bar to produce affidavits proving that one was "loyal" to the
government. The Court showed similar schizophrenia with regard to
election law, holding unconstitutional Ohio's ballot restrictions against
minority parties204 but finding acceptable a New York statute requiring a
voter to enroll in the party of his choice some thirty days before the general
election in order to vote in the next party primary.20 5 The latter is all the
more inexplicable in that the Court struck down statutes denying welfare
benefits unless recipients met a length of residence requirement.0 6
Three fairly recent cases suggest that the Court is returning to the
requirement of a showing of harm before the freedom of association of the
NAACP decision will be recognized. In Buckley v. Valeo 207 the Court
found an absence of the requisite showing of harm before nondisclosure
was permitted under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The next
year, the Court refused to extend freedom of association principles to the
physicians in New York who were required to disclose to the State Health
Department which patients received certain classified drugs .20 Finally, in
what must be considered a most aberrational use of NAA CP, the Court
held in Runyon v. McCrary20 9 that parents of white children had a first
amendment freedom of association that protected their sending their
children to a school that taught the necessity of racial segregation. That
right, however, did not extend to the school's exclusion of black children.
The white parents had not shown that the admission of black children
would inhibit the teaching of the belief and dogma protected by their first
amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NAACP decision, viewed in isolation from the subsequent
opinions that rely upon it, seems to suggest that the concept of privacy is
logically entailed by freedom of speech and the penumbral right of
freedom of association. The Court's terminology-the right of freedom of
association is characteristically self-nullified at the very moment of
assertion-implied more than could be justified. The privilege not to
disclose one's associations is a function of practical considerations such as
harassment, loss of employment and so on-the sort of effects that would
chill the full exploration of one's beliefs and would intimidate the
203. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
204. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
205. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
206. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
207. 424 U.S. 1, 69, 241 n,4 (1975).
208. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
209. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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advocate. Because of the need to protect the individual's first amendment
right, the Court found standing for the organization to assert that
constitutional right on behalf of its members.
During the period after the NAACP decision, the Court was faced
with two competing demands. The Court wanted to protect the emerging
civil rights movement, and it thus repeatedly found the precedent of
NAACP determinative of the protection of the activities of the persons
involved in that movement. The Court stretched its conception of freedom
of association so that it could embrace and protect the promotion of
litigation, peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins. A very strong pull in the
opposite direction was the national alarm at the infiltration of
communists into the very fabric of Amrican life. In response, employers
required loyalty oaths and investigatory bodies charged and convicted the
suspected subversive on contempt for refusal to reveal membership in
organizations. Known communists were denied employment and denied
passports. Thus, while membership in some organizations was protected,
membership in others was not. The Court struggled to find some consistent
rationale for the considerable number of cases decided in the 1960s on
freedom of association. Although the Court never seemed to find that
rationale, the political climate changed. The civil rights movement came to
be more acceptable to mainstream America and the witch-hunt cooled. No
longer was it generally believed that subversives lurked behind every
"front" organization.
That the rationale of the NAACP cases has never been coherently
worked out is currently a benign fact of the history of the Court. Those
who wish to protect worthy causes can take comfort in NAACP and the
many, many cases that followed it. Nevertheless, the lack of theoretical
neatness in the area of first amendment protection is disturbing. Nothing
suggests that the fear and turmoil of the 1960s and the Vietnam era cannot
return. Hence, precisely when the marketplace of ideas will again most
need the guidance of clear heads, no one will know which organizations
will be considered "worthy."
Marsha Rockey Schermer
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